Abstract. We analyze equilibrium bidding behavior in the open ascending-bid auction with identity-dependent externalities. With reciprocal externalities, the allocation is determined by bidders' consumption values alone. With large non-reciprocal externalities, the open auction generates higher expected revenue compared to standard sealed-bid auctions. The progress of the open auction reveals more information about the identity of the potential winner, allowing active bidders greater opportunity to avoid incurring payo¤-reducing externalities. The associated option value to staying active up until a relatively high price translates into higher expected revenue. Multiple bidders may sequentially quit at the same price, and relative to sealed-bid auctions, bidders experience less ex-post regret.
Introduction
Auctions are often followed by strategic interaction amongst the bidders, causing losing bidders to experience externalities that are speci…c to the identity of the auction winner. Consider for example, the recent bidding by several major league baseball teams, for the services of baseball's coveted free-agent, short-stop Alex Rodriguez. After weeks of initial talks, the …eld narrowed to three teams, the Atlanta Braves, the New York Mets, and the Texas Rangers. Of these three teams, the Atlanta Braves and NY Mets compete for playo¤ berths from the same league (National League East) while the Texas Rangers plays in a di¤erent league (American League West). An obvious implication of this is that if Rodriguez were to be recruited say, by the Mets, that would have had a substantially negative e¤ect on the Braves' chances of making it to the playo¤s, and vice versa.
On the other hand, if Rodriguez were to sign for the Rangers, the Braves' and Met's chances of securing a playo¤ berth would have remained largely una¤ected. Therefore, if the alternative was for the Mets to sign Rodriguez, it would have been natural to expect the Braves to bid a high salary amount, re ‡ecting the large negative externality that the latter would su¤er in the alternative event.
On the other hand, if the alternative was for Rodriguez to play for the Rangers, then the Braves would have been expected to bid a relatively lower amount, re ‡ecting purely the bene…t they would derive from using his services.
More generally, in an auction with identity dependent externalities, any given bidder's willingnessto-pay is endogenous, and in particular, dependent on the equilibrium allocation of the object amongst her rivals. Consider in this setting, the dynamics of an open ascending bid auction. As the auction progresses, each bidder gets to observe the current price and the identity of the standing high bidder. It is then natural to expect that whether or not a bidder raises the standing high bid would depend not only on her intrinsic use value of the object, but also on the magnitude of the externality that the standing high bidder's use of the object would in ‡ict on her. In other words, for a certain price, a given bidder may bid with renewed intensity after a period of silence (if her arch rival suddenly became the standing high bidder), and conversely, stop raising bids abruptly (whenever her arch rival were no longer the standing high bidder). Indeed, after the Mets publicly announced that they were no longer interested in Rodriguez, the Braves took little time to quit the race, resulting in Rodriguez signing to play for the Texas Rangers.
1
An alternative auction format that is commonly used is a …rst-price sealed-bid auction (FPA).
In a FPA, bidders are asked to simultaneously submit dollar amounts by way of sealed bids, and the object is allocated to the highest bidder at a price equal to her bid. It is of particular interest to note that with identity dependent externalities, a sealed bid auction is fundamentally di¤erent from an open ascending bid auction in the extent of information that is revealed to the bidders before …nal bids become due. Unlike an open ascending bid auction, a sealed bid auction does not o¤er a bidder any information on the interim allocation probabilities for her rivals. This motivates the central question that is addressed in this paper, viz., whether or not the open and the sealed bid auctions continue to be allocatively-and revenue-equivalent in the presence of identity dependent externalities. 2 Identity dependent externalities can be either reciprocal or non-reciprocal. Imagine, for example, a di¤erentiated product oligopoly where each product variety has a Cournot duopoly. In other words, for every …rm, there is one other …rm that manufactures a perfect substitute of her product, and several other …rms that manufacture imperfect substitutes. 3 Consider for this market structure, the auction of a process innovation that would lower the marginal cost of any …rm that wins it, by a constant amount. Assume also that the status-quo costs of all …rms are equal. In this case, each …rm, conditional on losing the auction, would prefer that the winner be the producer of an imperfect substitute rather than the perfect substitute of her product. Moreover, the decrease in pro…ts su¤ered by a losing bidder would depend on the cross-price elasticity of demand between her product and the winning …rm's product. Therefore, for any given losing bidder, the magnitude of the externality would remain unchanged if the winner and loser's identities were swapped. Hence, in this case, the externalities in ‡icted by any given bidder pair on each other are equal i.e., reciprocal.
On the other hand, externalities may be non-reciprocal in many interesting economic environments. Consider the nuclear disasrmament example discussed in Jehiel et al. (1996) , where nations bid for ownership of nuclear arsenal which were inherited by the newly independent, erstwhile Soviet republics (Ukraine in this particular example). Consider the mutual rivalry relationship between a already nuclear capable nation (which, conditional on acquiring the weapons, would simply destroy them in order to contain nuclear proliferation), and a rogue nation without nuclear capability (that may well intend to use the weapons in its aggression against the former). In this case, while the former would su¤er a large negative externality if the rogue nation won the bidding, the latter would stand to lose little if the already nuclear capable nation were to win. Therefore, externalities between these two bidders are non-reciprocal in nature.
We …nd that the revenue and allocation comparison between the open and sealed-bid auctions depends on whether externalities are reciprocal or non-reciprocal. Quite remarkably, in the case where externalities are reciprocal for every bidder pair, we …nd that in the symmetric equilibrium of the open ascending-bid auction, each bidder bids only up to a price that equals her use value of the object, so long as at least two other bidders are active. As a result, in equilibrium, the object is always allocated to the bidder who has the highest use value for it. In other words, the magnitude of the externalities do not act as determinants of the winner's identity. This is unlike a standard sealed-bid auction, where the winner is the bidder who has the highest average willingness-to-pay, the latter being the di¤erence between a bidder's use value and the average externality experienced by her in the event she loses the auction. In general, the comparison of expected revenue between the two auction formats is ambiguous. However, subject to the restriction that average externality su¤ered (conditional on losing) is the same across bidders, the open and standard sealed-bid auctions are allocatively-and revenue-equivalent.
On the other hand, when externalities are non-reciprocal, each bidder's equilibrium willingnessto-pay is in fact determined by the identities of her active opponents. In the structure of payo¤s that we examine in detail, each bidder stays active up until the price that equals her maximum willingness-to-pay, given the set of her active opponents. As a result, the magnitude of nonreciprocal externalities (together with bidders' use values) determines not only the price but also the allocation. The open auction can be allocatively di¤erent from the sealed-bid auction. Moreover, the expected revenue from the open auction can be higher than that from standard sealed-bid auctions if the magnitude of the non-reciprocal externalities is su¢ciently high.
The intuition underlying these …ndings is simple, yet compelling. If externalities are reciprocal, then for any two bidders that may survive till the …nal round of bidding, the one who has the higher use value also has the higher willingness-to-pay. As a result, if all but one bidder follow the symmetric strategy of dropping out of the auction when the price reaches their respective use values, the remaining bidder would have zero probability of outbidding a rival at any price higher than her own use value. Therefore, she can do no better than quit the auction when the price reaches her own use value of the object. Contrast this with the case of non-reciprocal externalities. Now, for any bidder pair that survives to become the highest and second highest bidders, the winner is the bidder with the higher willingness-to-pay, which, due to non-reciprocity in externalities, need not be the bidder with the higher use value of the object. As a result, by staying active up until prices that are higher than her use value of the object, a bidder can, with positive probability, expect to pro…tably outbid her arch rival, should the latter remain active till the …nal round of the auction.
In other words, bidders experience an option value to staying active up until high prices. The high prices up to which bidders tend to stay active can cause the expected revenue from the open auction to be higher than that from the standard sealed-bid auctions. This is shown to be true when the externalities are su¢ciently large. The option value created by the revelation of additional information during the course of the open auction is thus extracted by the seller (at least partially) in the form of higher expected revenue. Two other features of the equilibrium to the open auction are of interest. First, when externalities are non-reciprocal, the exit of a bidder from the auction at a certain price can cause several bidders to successively quit the auction at the same price. Intuitively, at high enough prices, the exit of a bidder will cause a discrete reduction in the willingness-to-pay of those bidders who stayed active only to thwart the former from winning. The former's exit will then cause them to withdraw from the bidding abruptly. Such exit(s) may then trigger further abrupt exit(s), and so on. An example is provided where the auction ends at the same price at which the …rst bidder exit occurs. Second, it is shown that the equilibrium allocation in a standard sealed-bid auction may leave the bidders with ex-post regret that they either did not bid enough, or in the case of the winner, bid too much. In contrast, the equilibrium of the open auction (for both reciprocal, and non-reciprocal externalities) has the property that bidders do not experience ex-post regret. 5
The idea that the open ascending-bid auction reveals more payo¤-relevant information compared to the sealed-bid auctions has been explored in Milgrom and Weber (1982) , for the case of informational externalities in bidder valuations (say, a common component in valuations that is observed only with some noise). There, bidders update their beliefs about the common value component through rational interpretation of their rivals' bidding behavior. The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that a similar di¤erence may exist between the sealed-bid and open auctions when there are purely allocative externalities. Here, bidders update their beliefs about the possible identity of the auction winner (and hence the externality they will receive conditional on losing) by observing their rivals' bidding behavior. 6 Auctions with identity dependent externalities has been the subject of several recent papers. Important contributions to this literature include Jehiel et al. (1996 Jehiel et al. ( , 1999 which characterize revenue maximizing auctions under di¤erent information structures, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000a) which examines e¢cient auction design, and Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) which illustrates the strategic motive for non-participation. In Section 3, we draw on Jehiel et al. (1999) A di¤erent strand of the literature on auctions with ex-post interactions focuses on the incentive of bidders to distort their bids in an e¤ort to manipulate their rivals' beliefs in the after market. 7
In contrast to that literature, this paper does not explicitly model the post-auction game, nor does it consider the informational linkage between the auction and the after market. Instead, attention is focussed solely on the identity dependent nature of payo¤ externalities, which in turn are taken as exogenous (in particular, independent of the bids at the auction).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the structure of payo¤s and information, and Section 3 draws on Jehiel et al. (1999) to brie ‡y recapitulate equilibrium bidding in standard sealed-bid auctions. Section 4 introduces a model of the open ascending-bid auction, which is then …rst analyzed for reciprocal externalities in Section 5, and subsequently for non-reciprocal externalities in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. An appendix contains the proof of Proposition 3. The proof of Proposition 2, which is similar to that of Proposition 3, is available as a supplement to this article (online at http://www.rje.org/main/sup-mat.html).
Payo¤s and information
Consider the auction of a single indivisible object amongst n¸3 bidders. Let the set of bidders be denoted by S. Bidder i's use value of the object is denoted by the random variable e v i which is distributed according to the probability distribution F (:) with corresponding density function f(:).
We assume that F (:) is continuous, strictly increasing over the bounded support
and is common knowledge amongst all bidders. The realized value of the random variable e v i (denoted by v i ) is assumed to be privately known to bidder i. For each bidder i, there exists a unique bidder s i 2 f j 2 S jj 6 = ig, such that if we denote the remaining rivals of bidder i by w i 2 Snfi; s i g, and the auction winner by !, then bidder i's payo¤ (gross of any payments made by her) is
where e > 0. Bidder i's willingness to pay is therefore not unique but dependent on the identity of her rival in question. We refer to s i and w i as strong and weak respectively, with respect to bidder i. 8 Throughout the paper we will assume that for each bidder i, the identity of s i is common knowledge. 9
The model is a special case of the general framework in Jehiel et al. (1999 
Standard sealed-bid auctions
A mechanism closely related to the …rst-price sealed-bid auction, is the second-price sealed-bid or the Vickrey auction, in which the object is allocated to the highest bidder, but at a price equal to the second highest (highest losing) bid. In an environment where losing bidders are subject to identity dependent externalities, a given bidder's willingness-to-pay for the auctioned object depends on her conjecture about the identity of the potential winner, in the event she herself does not win. Unlike an open ascending bid auction format, any sealed-bid format induces a simultaneous move game wherein each bidder must submit her bid without the bene…t of being able to observe any part of her opponent's bidding behavior.
In a framework much more general than ours, Jehiel et al. (1999) de…ne a standard mechanism as one where bidders submit one dimensional bids. 10 Furthermore, they de…ne an anonymous mechanism as one where (i) bidder i's payment and probability of getting the object are una¤ected if two of his opponents swap their bids, and (ii) if bidders i and j swap their bids, their corresponding payments and win probabilities are swapped. In what they call a symmetric revelation principle, they then show that in any symmetric equilibrium of a standard anonymous mechanism which always transfers the object to the buyers and in which each type of every player participates, the one-dimensional "type" measuring 'valuation minus average externality', together with the bid, completely determines a bidder's expected payo¤. In other words, the one-dimensional statistic measuring valuation minus average externality is su¢cient to characterize a bidder's strategy (Jehiel et al., 1999) . The intuition is that if bidders play a symmetric strategy pro…le, then conditional on losing, a bidder can expect each one of her rivals to win with equal probability. As a result, conditional on losing, she can expect to receive a payo¤ that is equal to the average of the externalities in ‡icted upon her by her rivals.
Observe that the …rst-and second-price sealed-bid auctions are standard mechanisms. Using their insight of the symmetric revelation principle, Jehiel et al. have established that the symmetric equilibrium strategy for each bidder in a second-price sealed-bid auction is to bid her "type". 11 Using techniques that are by now standard in auction theory (see for example, Samuelson,1981, or Matthews,1995) , it is straightforward to adapt Jehiel et al.'s (1999) second-price auction result to a …rst-price sealed-bid format in our model. As such, its formal proof is left out of the paper.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium to a …rst-price sealed-bid auction in which bidder i follows the bidding strategy
The bid function resembles that in a symmetric independent private values auction (with riskneutral bidders), with bidder "types" now de…ned as use value minus average externality. The auction is won by the bidder who has the highest use value. Let v (n¡i+1) denote the ith highest order statistic of n independent, random draws from the probability distribution F (:). The revenue earned by the seller, on average, equals E[v (n¡1) ] + e=(n ¡ 1) where E[:] denotes the expectation with respect to F (:).
Notice that Proposition 1 requires symmetry in externalities su¤ered, i.e., the assumption that for each i, there exists a unique s i . However, we have (so far) not imposed symmetry in externalities in ‡icted. In other words, we have not assumed that the total externality in ‡icted on losing bidders is a constant which is independent of the identity of the winning bidder. As a result, the allocation in the symmetric equilibrium of a standard sealed-bid auction need not be e¢cient. However, conditional on symmetry in externalities in ‡icted, the e¢cient allocation is to award the object to the bidder with the highest use value, which is accomplished by the sealed-bid format.
Interestingly, in an environment in which bidders experience identity dependent externalities, the …rst-price sealed-bid auction remains strategically equivalent to a Dutch-descending bid auction.
In that format, starting from some initial high price, the seller continuously lowers the price till some bidder cries out that the price-clock be stopped. The bidder who is the …rst to cry out wins the auction at the price at which she cried out. Even though such a format is open in that it does not require the simultaneous submission of sealed bids, its progress does not provide the bidders with any information about the possible identity of the auction winner. In this respect, it is no di¤erent from the sealed-bid formats.
4 Open ascending-bid auction Milgrom and Weber (1982) have analyzed the so-called "button model" as an approximation to the open ascending bid auction. In the "button model", starting from some initial low price, the seller increases the price continuously and each bidder indicates her active bidding status by keeping a button pressed. A bidder can irrevocably exit from the auction at any price simply by releasing her button at that price. All active bidders observe the identity and the quitting price of each exiting bidder. The exit of each bidder starts a new phase of the auction, and the auction ends at the price at which the second last bidder exits. The last remaining bidder wins the object at this price. A bidding strategy in any phase of such an auction is a price at which to quit the auction in that particular phase. As alluded to in the Introduction, the most important di¤erence with the sealed-bid auction is the ability of bidders in the button auction to change their bidding strategy from one phase to the next in response to more information (the identity of the bidder that just quit) that becomes available at the start of every successive phase. In the language of Jehiel et al. (1999) , the open auction is then neither standard, nor anonymous.
Notice that unlike in the Milgrom and Weber model, in our context, the assumption of each bidder's use value being a continuous random variable and the search for an equilibrium in strategies that are strictly increasing functions of use values within each phase does not insure that no two bidders would want to quit the auction at the same price. In fact, in our set-up of identity dependent externalities, it is conceivable that at certain high prices, a bidder may wish to quit the auction immediately after observing her strong rival's exit. In the "button model", where the seller raises the price continuously (and in particular, does not pause after each exit), certain bidder type's optimal exit prices are then not well-de…ned. 12 To make the auction game well-de…ned, we introduce the following additional assumption in Milgrom and Weber's "button model". After every exit, the seller stops the price clock and o¤ers the remaining active bidders an opportunity to quit the auction at the extant price. If one or more bidders accept this o¤er and quit the auction at the extant price, then the seller again makes the same o¤er to the bidders that then remain. Only if none of the remaining active bidders are willing to quit the auction at the extant price, does the seller resume the price clock. We call that phase of the auction in which the price clock is moving with l active bidders, the rising phase r l . The price at which r l ends is denoted by p l . The phase wherein the seller stops the price clock and o¤ers the remaining l active bidders an opportunity to quit the auction at the extant price p l+1 is called the frozen phase ± l . Needless to say, every time one or more bidders quit during a frozen phase, the corresponding subsequent rising phases get passed by.
If during some frozen phase, all remaining bidders choose to quit the auction, then the object is awarded at random to one of those bidders at the frozen price. Otherwise, the auction is won by the last remaining bidder at price p 2 at which rising phase r 2 comes to an end. 13
Since use values of the object are independent and private across bidders, the only relevant information that is revealed during the course of the open auction is the identity of the set of bidders who continue to be active (and therefore, may potentially win the auction). Let us denote this set in phase l by ' l µ S. Clearly, ' l could be any element of the power set of S that has cardinality l. Accordingly, we will write the rising and frozen phases of the auction explicitly as
A strategy for each bidder in the "button model" described above consists of the following elements for each l = n; n ¡ 1; :::; 2: (i) a price at which to quit r l (p l+1 ; ' l ), (ii) a decision on whether or not to quit the auction during ± l (p l+1 ; ' l ). To be more precise, bidder i's strategy in rising phase r l is a map b
, while her strategy in the frozen phase ± l is a map b
stayg where P l (S) denotes the largest subset of the power set of S such that each member of P l (S) has cardinality l.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the open auction consists of a strategy for each bidder such that given the strategies played by her opponents, her own strategy maximizes her expected payo¤ from the auction. We study, in turn, two cases, reciprocal and non-reciprocal externalities. For each case, we solve for symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria of the open auction in strategies that are strictly increasing functions of use values, and characterize the associated allocation and expected revenue. 14 To make precise the notion of symmetry, we restrict attention to equilibria where in any phase l, all i 2 ' l such that s i 2 ' l employ strategies that are some identical function of their use values, and similarly, all j 2 ' l such that s j = 2 ' l employ strategies that are some identical function of their use values.
Reciprocal externalities
For this section, we assume that the total number of bidders in the set S is even. We de…ne reciprocal externalities for our model as the case where for every bidder i, s i is such that s s i = i.
In other words, bidders can be grouped into m pairs (n = 2m) such that any bidder i's willingness to pay is v i + e with respect to her group partner, and v i with respect to any other bidder.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the following strategies.
Proof. See Appendix B (online supplement).
Stated informally, the equilibrium involves each bidder dropping out of the auction when the price reaches her use value of the object, in any phase up until l = 3. In phase l = 2, the remaining bidders each have a unique willingness-to-pay, and therefore a dominant strategy, viz., to quit the auction when the price reaches their willingness-to-pay with respect to their only active rival.
The equilibrium is intuitive. Suppose all bidders j 2 ' l ni follow the strategy in (2). Faced with this strategy pro…le for her rivals, bidder i can do no better than follow the same strategy. To see this, observe that bidder i would want to stay active above the price v i i¤ s i were to otherwise win the auction. But for bidder i to actually prevent s i from winning the auction by staying active at prices higher than v i , it must be that fi; s i g 2 ' 2 . However, if fi; s i g 2 ' 2 , due to reciprocity, i and Corollary 1 When externalities are reciprocal, i.e. i = s s i for all i 2 S, in their symmetric equilibria, the standard sealed-bid and the open ascending bid auctions achieve the same allocation and raise the same expected revenue.
A robustness check of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 may be useful. To do this, let us consider a fully general model of reciprocal externalities, where each bidder i is privately informed of her use value of the object v i , whereas, the reciprocal externality in ‡icted by any bidder j on bidder i (6 = j), while commonly known, can take any value v ij . 17 In other words, consider the model of Jehiel et al. (1999) , assuming that the externalities (v ij etc.) are reciprocal, and common knowledge. It is clear that the intuition underlying Proposition 2 would continue to hold in this more general environment. As a result, the following modi…cation of the strategies described in Proposition 2 would constitute a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the open auction.
for j = ' 2 ni and l = 2.
As in our model, the winner (!) of the open ascending-bid auction is the bidder with the highest use value of the auctioned object. Interestingly, the magnitudes of the reciprocal externalities in ‡icted by the bidders on each other (i.e. the values of v ij etc.) play no role in determining the identity of the auction winner. In this sense, the message of Proposition 2 is quite general.
The comparison between the open and sealed-bid auctions in this more general environment turns out to be problematic, and ambiguous. Note that characterizing the allocation and revenue from a standard sealed-bid auction is now complicated. In particular, ex-ante symmetry in use values is not enough to insure the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, because the average externality su¤ered (assumed commonly known) may not be equal across bidders. Those bidders that su¤er greater average externalities can then be expected to bid more aggressively. 18 Even if the externalities were modeled as private information to the respective bidders, 19 if they are reciprocal, then each v ij = v ji has to be common knowledge among bidders i and j. Consider then the event v ij > v ik (say). All else equal, bidder i can then expect that P q2Snj v ji > P q2Snk v ki , and therefore, on average, that bidder j would bid more aggressively than bidder k. In either case, equilibria can only be asymmetric. Asymmetric equilibria of sealed-bid auctions typically lack closed-form solutions for bidder strategies. As a result, the equilibrium allocation and expected revenue can only be computed numerically (see e.g. Marshall et al., 1994) . Nonetheless, it is clear that with a general structure of payo¤s, the allocation in a sealed-bid auction will not be invariant to the magnitude of the externalities (v ij etc.). In particular, those bidders that su¤er greater externalities conditional on losing will be more likely to win (as a result of bidding more aggressively than others). Hence, the allocation (and quite possibly the expected revenue) is unlikely to be the same in the two auction formats. 20 Finally, notice that the open ascending-bid auction need not be ex-post e¢cient for this generalized payo¤ structure. To see this, consider for example, the realization of use values and mutual externalities such that v ! = maxfi 2 Sjv i g but v ! + P j2Snw v j! < v i + P j2Sni v ji for some i. Based on the comparison of our model with the more general payo¤ structure, it is then evident that if externalities are reciprocal, then in its symmetric equilibrium, the open ascending bid auction is ex-post e¢cient if the total externality in ‡icted on all losing bidders is a constant and independent of the identity of the winning bidder (symmetry in externalities in ‡icted).
Non-reciprocal externalities
We de…ne any 2 bidders i; j as experiencing non-reciprocal externalities if j = s i ) i 6 = s j . 21 We consider an auction amongst n "adjacent" bidders, indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; n that satisfy the relationship i + 1 = s i for i = 1; ::; n ¡ 1, and 1 = s n . 22 The model is depicted in Figure 1 , where i ! j denotes i = s j . The structure of externalities here is one-to-one, in that for any bidder i, there exists a unique bidder j 6 = s i such that i = s j . 23;24 [INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] Notice that at the start of r n , the externality relationships amongst all active bidders gives rise to a closed chain. At the end of r n , this chain gets opened out, and every subsequent bidder exit either shortens or breaks this chain into sub-chains.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the following strategies.
if s i 2 ' l :
Proof. See Appendix A.
Stated informally, the equilibrium involves each bidder staying active up to the price that equals her maximum willingness-to-pay with respect to her active opponents. As in the case of reciprocal externalities, the equilibrium is intuitive. Suppose all bidders in the set Sni are following the strategy described in (4). Non-reciprocity implies that if ' 2 = fi; s i g, then with positive probability, bidder i can outbid s i and obtain a payo¤ strictly greater than ¡e. In other words, the option of staying active at prices higher than v i just to be able to outbid s i in the …nal phase of the auction has positive value in equilibrium. Moreover, it must be that if ' 3 = fi; s i ; w i g, by the assumed structure of non-reciprocity (in particular, the assumption that no bidder can be strong with respect to more than one of her rivals), s i = w w i . But this implies that the equilibrium probability that w i would want to quit the auction immediately upon observing s i quit is zero.
Therefore, if ' 2 = fi; w i g, then even if p 3 > v i , bidder i can quit in ± 2 and guarantee herself a payo¤ of 0. In other words, in equilibrium, it is a zero probability event that if i were to bid any higher than v i in phase r 3 , she might end up winning the object at a price higher than v i , when in fact s i would not have won otherwise. Put di¤erently, if i bids higher than v i in phase r 3 , she can always insure a payo¤ of 0 for herself, if s i happens to be the …rst bidder to quit in r 3 .
Therefore, the cost of availing the option (of being able to outbid s i in the …nal phase should the event ' 2 = fi; s i g be realized, by staying active up until the price v i + e) is zero. As a result, each bidder i avails of the option by staying active till the price v i + e, so long as s i stays active.
The importance of the assumption that externalities are one-to-one deserves discussion. Suppose, instead, there exists some bidder j such that j = s i and j = s k where k 6 = i. Consider the event ' 3 = fi; j; kg. Now, bidder i knows that if the equilibrium strategy for k involves staying active at prices higher than v k , then with positive probability, bidder k will want to quit in ± 2 if ' 2 = fi; kg. In fact, at any p 3 > maxfv k ; v i g, if ' 2 = fi; kg, bidders i and k will both want to quit the auction in ± 2 , resulting in a expected payo¤ of 1 2 (v i ¡ p 3 ) < 0 for i. This means that the option of being able to outbid s i in ± 2 is costly, because it could, with positive probability, entail a negative payo¤ for i when in fact i's weak rival k would have otherwise won the auction. Moreover, in phases r 3 and earlier, the cost of the option to bidder i increases with the price up to which she chooses to stay active. Therefore, when non-reciprocal externalities are not purely one-to-one, bidder i will balance the option value against its cost, and choose to keep the option alive up to a price that is greater than v i , but perhaps not as high as v i + e. 25 Das Varma (1999) illustrates this idea in a 3 bidder model of an open ascending bid auction, where the realization of s i (which is assumed to be stochastic) is private information to i. As a result, with positive probability, externalities are non-reciprocal, and not one-to-one. It is shown there that in r 3 , bidder i chooses to stay active up until a price b i that satis…es v i +2e=3 · b i < v i +e. However, it is also shown there that closed-form bid functions do not exist for generic distributions. The lack of closed form bid functions (in say r 3 ) prevents us from …nding closed form expressions for equilibrium continuation payo¤s (V i (r 3 ; v i ) etc., see Appendix), making it impossible to solve such a model by backwards induction. In this paper, the restriction to non-reciprocal externalities that are one-to-one enables closed form solutions for bid functions in each phase, making it possible to extend the model to any n¸3 bidders. 26 Whenever bidder i stays active at prices higher than v i (i.e. while s i is still active), the exit of s i causes bidder i to quit the auction, at the same price, in the frozen phase that is initiated by the exit of s i . In fact, in our model of one-to-one non-reciprocal externalities, consider the (albeit extreme) event in which the realizations of the use values are such that v (1) +e¸v (n) . In this event, all bidders will quit the auction in succesive frozen phases (one after another), and the auction will end at the price v (1) + e which marks the exit of the …rst bidder. Even in a model where nonreciprocal externalities are not one-to-one (as in Das Varma, 1999), the positive net option value to i from staying active at some prices higher than v i makes sequential bidder exits at the same price a positive probability event. Such "herd" behavior type bidding is not otherwise predicted in a button model where bidder values are realizations of continuously distributed random variables. 27 Unlike the case of reciprocal externalities, the equilibrium of our simple model of non-reciprocal externalities suggests that strategies under a more general structure of payo¤s will be multidimensional. In particular, consider again the general model discussed at the end of Section 5, now without the restriction v ij = v ji for all i; j. 28 Hypothetically, suppose each bidder j 2 Sni follows the strategy of staying active till the price reaches her highest potential willingness-to-pay (i.e., use value plus the magnitude of the largest externality in ‡icted on her by her active opponents).
Then, with positive probability, more than one bidder will quit the auction in any frozen phase.
As discussed above, this introduces a positive cost to the option of staying active at prices higher than ones minimum potential willingness-to-pay, so that it will not be in bidder i's interest to stay active till the price reaches her highest potential willingness-to-pay. Moreover, for each bidder i, the option value and option cost of staying active at high prices will, in general, depend on the vector of potential willingnesses-to-pay of all active bidders. The high dimensionality of strategies in this environment makes it di¢cult to study its equilibria. 
Allocation and price
Observe from the nature of the equilibrium strategies in Proposition 3 that the price at which the auction concludes, as well as the identity of the winner is dependent not only on the realized values of the order statistics v (n¡i+1) , but also on the identity of the bidders who realize those order statistics as their use values. As an example, consider again the event where v (1) +e¸v (n) , in which bidders quit sequentially, and the auction ends at the price v (1) + e. First, suppose the decreasing sequence fv (n¡i+1) g i=1;:::;n is realized, in that order, by bidders 1; :::; n (as depicted in Figure 1 ).
By Proposition 3, we know that the …rst bidder who will quit the auction is the lowest valued bidder (bidder n), followed by n ¡ 1, and so on, leaving bidder 1 (with value v (n) ) as the winner. Now, suppose the sequence fv (n¡i+1) g i=1;:::;n is realized in such a way that v n = v (2) , v n¡1 = v (1) , and bidders n ¡ 2; n ¡ 3; :::; 2; 1 realize, in that order, the sequence fv (n¡i+1) g i=1;2;:::;n¡2 . In this case, the …rst bidder to quit is the lowest valued bidder (bidder n ¡ 1), followed by bidder n ¡ 2, n¡3, and so on, leaving bidder n (with valuation v (2) ) as the winner. The latter example illustrates that ex-post gains to trade may exist following an open auction. 31 Similar examples are easy to create such that for any given realization of the sequence fv (n¡i+1) g i=1;:::;n , the price depends on the identities of the bidders who realize these valuations.
When ex-post willingness-to-pay is di¤erent from interim willingness-to-pay, a common concern amongst bidders is whether or not they bid enough (or alternately, whether they bid too much). 32
Consider again the price and allocation in a standard sealed-bid auction. Suppose, the winner (!) pays a price between v w + e=(n ¡ 1) and v w , while the loser is some bidder other than s ! . In this case, the winner's ex-post willingness-to-pay is v w , and ex-post, she would regret having overpaid.
On the other hand, if some bidder i loses the auction that is then won by s i at a price less than v i + e, bidder i would regret not having bid higher. 33 We know from Proposition 1 that both of these events are possible in a sealed-bid auction. In contrast, it is straightforward to see that in an open auction (with reciprocal, or non-reciprocal externalities), no losing bidder regrets her bid ex-post. Furthermore, given the identity of the highest losing bidder, the winner never regrets the price. 34;35;36 We state this in the following Remark. The proof of Proposition 4 relies on a strong su¢cient condition for the revenue ranking. A more careful analysis of some of the (n ¡ 1)! di¤erent maps between the sequence of order statistics fv (n¡i+1) g i=1;2;:::;n and relative bidder identities (as depicted in Figure 1 ), could possibly lead to a tighter lower bound on the price. However, it appears unlikely that a simple necessary condition will easily emerge from such an exercise.
The intuition for the revenue ranking result in Proposition 4 derives from the equilibrium strategies in Proposition 3. Recall that when externalities are non-reciprocal, the open ascendingbid auction reveals more information (than a standard sealed-bid auction), that only active bidders have the option to use in order to avoid incurring the externality. The net expected value of this option (that is option bene…t -option cost) is increasing in the magnitude of the externality. Therefore, the price up to which any bidder i stays active, so long as s i is also active, is increasing in the magnitude of e (in our model of non-reciprocal externalities, this price is in fact v i + e). But the price in the open ascending-bid auction must be bounded from below by the price at which the early quitters drop out. 37 For e su¢ciently large then, the early rounds of the open auction end at relatively higher prices, which insures that the …nal price is, on average, higher than the price from a sealed-bid auction. 38
In order to gain some understanding of the revenue comparison for small values of e, we calculate numerically, expected revenue from the open and sealed-bid auctions for the Uniform and Normal distributions. 39 The results are presented in Figure 3 . The plots show that the open auction raises at least as much expected revenue as the sealed-bid auctions at small values of e, and progressively higher revenue as the value of e increases. 40 [INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Conclusion
We have shown that when bidders experience identity dependent allocative externalities, the open ascending bid auction reveals more payo¤-relevant information compared to standard sealed-bid and descending-bid auctions. The central question examined is whether this additional information causes prices and allocations to be di¤erent in the two formats. In the case of reciprocal externalities, the allocation in an open auction is determined purely by bidders' use values. The same is true of the sealed-bid formats only if bidders are symmetric with respect to the externalities they su¤er.
In the case of non-reciprocal externalities, the price in an open auction can be greater than that in the sealed-bid auctions, especially if the magnitude of the externalities is su¢ciently large. Two additional features of the symmetric equilibrium of the open ascending bid auction are the "herd behavior" type phenomenon of sequential bidder exits at the same price, and the no ex-post regret property of bidder strategies.
Whether or not the di¤erent allocation in the open ascending-bid auction makes it more e¢cient than the sealed-bid auctions is found to be ambiguous, and sensitive to the structure of information, and quite possibly to the structure of payo¤s. Nonetheless, the tractable model employed in this paper leads to simple and intuitive bidding strategies that permit an illustration of the economic di¤erences between the two formats.
Appendix A
The following arguments and de…nitions apply to the proofs of Propositions 2 (supplementary material) and 3. First, observe that at the beginning of r 2 , bidder i has a unique willingness-topay, which is v i if s i = 2 ' 2 , and v i + e otherwise. The continuation game starting in r 2 being a straightforward 2 bidder open auction, bidder i has a dominant strategy, which is to stay active up until the price reaches her willingness to pay.
Also, observe that in any phase of the auction (rising or frozen), if s i = 2 ' l , then bidder i has a unique willingness-to-pay, viz. v i . Using standard arguments, it is then easy to establish that if s i = 2 ' l , bidder i has a dominant strategy of quitting the auction i¤ the price exceeds v i .
Let us de…ne V i (r l (p l+1 ; ' l ); v i ) as the equilibrium expected continuation payo¤ for bidder i at the start of phase r l (p l+1 ; ' l ), and V i (± l (p l+1 ; ' l ); v i ) as the same at the start of frozen phase
denote the probability distribution that the random variable e v j · z, conditional on s j 2 ' l and b r l j > p, with corresponding probability density function g l (zjp). In other words, G l (zjp) denotes the equilibrium updated belief of all other bidders about bidder j's use value conditional on bidder j's strong rival being active in r l , and bidder j's quitting price in r l being greater than some price p. 41 Also, from the dominant strategy arguments outlined earlier, we know that for any k 2 ' l , such that s k = 2 ' l , the updated belief about e v k , conditional on b
Let the corresponding probability density function be denoted by h l (zjp).
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall the dominant strategy arguments made for any bidder i in any phase l where i + 1 = 2 ' l , and also in phases ± 2 and r 2 . Therefore, we start with r 3 where, for some i, ' 3 is a set of the form fi; i + 1; w i g, i.e., a set of bidders that includes a certain bidder i, her strong rival s i´i + 1, and some other bidder from among the set of weak rivals of i. The Proposition is established via 2 lemmas. The …rst lemma derives the optimal bidding strategy of bidder i in phase l = 3. The second lemma derives the optimal strategy of i for phases l > 3.
Lemma 1 For the non-reciprocal externalities depicted in Fig. 1 , consider some i such that ' 3 = fi; i + 1; w i g. Then the unique symmetric equilibrium of the subgame that starts with r 3
involves the strategy b
Proof. 2 general cases are possible: (i) w i = s s i = i + 2, and (ii)
corresponds to a history of bidding (up until phase r 3 ) which leaves active 3 bidders that form one sub-chain of the original chain. Case (ii) corresponds to a bidding history which leaves active one sub-chain of 2 bidders and another isolated active bidder. We will consider each of these cases in turn to prove the following Lemma. 42 Note that bidder i's drop-out price in any phase must satisfy the bound v i · b
When deriving expressions for bidder i's equilibrium continuation payo¤s, we shall restrict attention to prices p that satisfy these bounds. While the actual price p 3 at which r 3 ends may or may not satisfy these bounds, that is irrelevant for our objective in deriving these expressions, which is to use them to compute bidder i's optimal drop out price. Suppose then phase r 3 ends at some price p 2 [v i ; v i + e]. We will derive bidder i's expected payo¤s at the start of frozen phase ± 2 for each conceivable outcome of bidding in phase r 3 , using in each case, the dominant strategies that we know exist starting with phase ± 2 . Starting with case (i), we have
To see (A2), note that if ' 2 = fi; i + 1g, then bidder i will stay in the auction till the price reaches v i + e. We also know that bidder i + 1 has a dominant strategy, viz. she will quit the auction in ± 2 if e v i+1 · p, otherwise she will stay in the auction till the price reaches e v i+1 . Hence bidder i will win the auction at frozen price p with probability G 3 (pjp), she will win the auction at price e v i+1
(if e v i+1 < v i + e) with corresponding probability density g 3 ( e v i+1 jp), and lose the auction to bidder
. In the last case bidder i's payo¤ is ¡e.
Using analogous arguments, we can derive the following expressions.
and
Also, we have the following expressions for the probabilty of the events ' 2 = fi; i + 1g, p 3 = p, and ' 2 = fi + 1; i + 2g, p 3 = p respectively.
Using the above expressions for expected payo¤s, weighted by the corresponding probabilities, we can formulate bidder i's optimization problem at the start of r 3 as
Using the expected payo¤ expressions, and (A5) and (A6), the …rst order necessary condition (FONC) corresponding to (A7) is
Next, note the following identities.
Using (i) through (iv), and cancelling the common term h 3 (b i jp 4 ), the FONC simpli…es to
which further simpli…es to
In a symmetric equilibrium in strictly increasing bid functions, it must be that b v; v] ) since, by hypothesis, s i+1 = i + 2 is active in r 3 . This implies
Incorporating the above equilibrium beliefs, we have
the unique solution to which is
To verify that b r 3 (v i ) = v i + e indeed maximizes the objective function in (A7), we appeal to (what is by now standard in the auction theory literature) the pseudo-concavity property of bidder i's objective function (see e.g., Milgrom and Weber, 1982, or Matthews, 1995) . That is, we seek to establish that
for all v i ; b i .
Di¤erentiating the right hand side of (A9) with respect to v i , and cancelling terms, we have
Now, we turn to case (ii), i.e., ' 3 = fi; i + 1; w i g where w i = 2 fi + 2; i ¡ 1g. Now, both i + 1 and w i have dominant strategies in r 3 which is to quit when the price reaches v i+1 , and v w i respectively.
To derive bidder i's optimal exit price, consider some price p, which we know must satisfy the bound p 2 [v i ; v i + e] in order to qualify as i's strategy in r 3 . The following expressions are then immediate.
Moreover, at the start of r 3 , the probability of the respective events are
Therefore, bidder i's optimization problem at the start of phase r 3 is
Simplifying the conditional probability terms as for case (i), (A19) can be written as
The FONC corresponding to (A20) is
Writing H(:) in terms of F (:), and cancelling through by h 3 (b i jp 4 ), (A21) simpli…es to
the unique solution to which is b i = b
The pseudo-concavity check for case (ii) is routine, and is therefore omitted. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 Suppose all active bidders except i follow the strategies described in (4) in all phases of the auction. Then in any phase l > 3, bidder i's best response would be to also use the strategy described in (4).
Proof. First, recall that in any phase l > 2, if fi; s i g ½ ' l , then bidder i's optimal bid must lie within the bound [v i ; v i + e]. Now, we can write the equilibrium expected payo¤ to bidder i in any phase r l where fi; s i g ½ ' l as
where E ' 2 ;p 3 denotes the expectation with respect to the equilibrium distribution of the set of bidders and the price, in frozen phase ± 2 , conditional on fi; s i g ½ ' l , and price p l+1 . In general, this distribution depends on the strategies used by the bidders ' l ni (which we have already hypothesized) and the (as yet unknown) strategy used by bidder i in phases r l through r 3 . Note that in any phase except r n , the remaining active bidders constitute one or more open chains. Suppose, in some phase l · n ¡ 1, active bidders i and i + 1 belong to the open-chain whose end members are numbered j and k (such that j · i and i + 1 · k). Refer to Figure 2 where, a bidder that originally occupied the location at the junction of two successive dotted arrows, is inactive in the phase depicted.
[ INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] Then under the hypothesized strategies for bidders Sni, the strategy of any bidder q 2 fi + 1; i + 2; :::; kg is independent of the strategies used by any of the active bidders amongst fj; j + 1; j + 2; ::; ig. In other words, under the hypothesized strategies, the exit price of any bidder q depends on the exit price of bidder q + m only if all intermediate bidders q + 1; q + 2; ::; q + m ¡ 1 are active. Starting with frozen phase ± n¡1 , if bidders i and i + 1 are still active, then there must be at least one intermediate bidder missing, so that the exit price of all active bidders amongst fi + 1; i + 2; :::; k; k + 1; :::; j ¡ 1g no longer depends on the exit price of i. In addition, under the hypothesized strategies, the exit of bidder i can only lower the willingness-to-pay, and hence exit prices of active bidders fj; j + 1; j + 2; ::; i ¡ 1g in the subsequent phases. 43 Therefore, the probability bidder i + 1 wins the auction is higher if bidder i quits in some phase l¸3, than if she stays active. To capture this formally, let ¡ l (b w i ; b i+1 ji 2 ' l ) denote the joint probability distribution of the highest bid among all active w i , and the bid of i + 1, conditional on i 2 ' l .
Also, let the corresponding density function be denoted by ¿ l (b w i ; b i+1 ji 2 ' l ). We then have for
Now, suppose bidder i adopts the strategy of bidding b i in any phase l < 3 of the auction in which s i is till active. Then, from (A23) and the de…nition of
Now, we know from (A2) and (A14) that
In other words, if bidder i stays active up until phase ± 2 , and …nds herself to be facing bidder i + 1, then she is guaranteed a payo¤ of at least ¡e and at most 0, so long as the price in phase ± 2 satis…es p 3 2 [v i ; v i + e], but a payo¤ less than or equal to ¡e if p 3 > v i + e.
Moreover, we know from (A3) and (A15) that for any
That is if bidder i stays active up until phase ± 2 at any price p 3 2 [v i ; v i + e], and …nds herself to be facing some bidder w i , then she is guaranteed a payo¤ of 0.
Incorporating (A27), we can write i's optimization problem in phase l as
From (A26) and (A24) it is then immediate that the unique solution to (A28) is for all i, our qualitative results would be preserved even though in the modi…ed payo¤ structure, the lower of the externalities su¤ered by bidder i is 0. In other words, what is critical for our results is that there be a di¤erence in the payo¤s received by bidder i when the auction is won by w i as opposed to s i (the magnitude of which is e), and not how we normalize the externality in ‡icted by s i .
9: An example that exactly …ts the model is the di¤erentiated products oligopoly described in the Introduction, with the added feature that the …xed production cost incurred by the successful …rm is private information to that …rm. 10: In Jehiel et al. (1999) , each bidder's valuation is a n-dimensional vector (say v i( v i1 v i2 :::v in ) for bidder i) where v ij is the payo¤ (gross of any payments made by the bidder) realized by i if the auction is won by j. v i is treated as private information to bidder i, and commonly known to all other bidders as a random draw from some probability distribution.
11: In fact, they show that a second-price sealed-bid auction together with an appropriate entry fee is optimal within the class of standard mechanisms.
12: To be precise, the strategy for bidder i of dropping out at a price p that solves min p>p ¤ fpg for some p ¤ has no solution.
13: It turns out that for reciprocal externalities, the phenonmenon of sequential bidder exits at the same price never occurs in equilibrium, while for non-reciprocal externalities, it occurs with positive probability. However, it may be useful to point out that this is found to be a property of the equilibrium, and is not a priori expected because of any restrictions imposed on the hypothesized equilibrium strategies. As such, the augmentation of the traditional button model with frozen phases ought not to be considered unnecessary for the case of reciprocal externalities.
14: The restriction of attention to symmetric strategy equilibria follows from our objective of re-evaluating the revenue equivalence result, which holds only when the symmetric equilibrium to the open auction is compared to the equilibrium of the FPA. To see that, consider for example, the no-externalities button model game between two bidders, each of who draws their private use value from some distribution with support [v; v] . The following asymmetric strategy pro…le constitutes a Nash equilibrium: bidder 1 bids 0 and bidder 2 bids v. However, the seller's revenue (which equals 0 in this equilibrium) will not equal his expected revenue in the symmetric equilibrium to the FPA (the reader may refer to Riley and Samuelson,1981 for the symmetric equilibrium strategies and resulting expected revenue in the FPA).
15: It is not optimal for s i to do so, but that is irrelevant.
16: In our model of reciprocal externalities, the total externality in ‡icted on losing bidders is constant, and independent of the winner's identity. Hence the allocation (to the bidder with the highest use value) is e¢cient. See however the last paragraph of this section.
17: That is v ij = v ji need not take values that are restricted to f0; ¡eg.
18: Note that although our qualitative results are invariant to whether externalities are positive or negative, simply as a matter of convention, we speak of externalities as if they are negative.
Therefore, greater externalities refers to negative externalities of a higher absolute value.
19: Drawn from symmetric probability distributions, as in Jehiel et al. (1999) . 20: Maskin and Riley (2000) show that in asymmetric settings, the revenue ranking between the open ascending-bid, and sealed-bid auctions is ambiguous in general.
21: In addition to the nuclear disarmament example discussed in the Introduction, consider the location of a waste dump in one of n towns that are located along a circle, and are numbered counterclockwise as 1; 2; ::; n. Suppose wind can blow some of the waste only as far as the neighboring town, and say, wind typically blows in a clockwise direction. Then if the dump is located in town i + 1, town i su¤ers a negative externality as a result of waste spillover, but not vice versa.
22: For the case n = 3, this is the unique non-reciprocal externality con…guration that is possible in our model. 23: In other words, the model is also symmetric with respect to externalities in ‡icted. Since the identity of each bidder's strong rival is common knowledge, this additional assumption helps keep the environment completely symmetric. This is, by no means, the unique con…guration of non-reciprocal externalities. See the end of this section for a discussion of other formulations.
24: It may be worthwhile to point out that in the more general payo¤ structure of Jehiel et al. (1999) (also described in footnote (10) of this paper), externalities can be non-reciprocal with positive probability. In other words, for any i; j, v ij need not equal v ji . 25: At price v i , the option value to bidder i of staying active is strictly positive, whereas its cost is zero. 27: A referee has pointed out that even if bidder values are realizations of continuously distributed random variables, simultaneous bidder exits (i.e., at the same price) can occur if instead of raising the asking price continuously (as in a button model), the seller raises it in discrete steps. A discrete raise of the price may pass by the valuations of multiple bidders.
28: As a way of admitting non-reciprocal externalities.
29: In particular, the large number of cases that arise due to the di¤erent possible values of the externalities, each leading to a di¤erent allocation and price, make it impossible to characterize equilibria in any general fashion.
30: The di¢culty of explicitly solving equilibrium strategies in auctions with multi-dimensional private information is evident in the literature on sealed-bid auctions with multi-unit demand (see e.g., Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) , Katzman (1995) , Noussair (1995) , Swinkels (1999), and Swinkels (2001) . As in Katzman's (1999) sequential second-price auctions, in the dynamic open ascending-bid auction considered in this paper, the di¢culty is further compounded by the requirement that bidders update their beliefs about their rivals' multi-dimensional private information from their observed bids in the previous phases.
31: Recall that in a sealed-bid auction, the object is always awarded to the bidder with the highest use value. In our model of non-reciprocal externalities, which is characterized by symmetry in externalities in ‡icted, this example then shows that the net surplus realized from a sealed-bid auction is at least as high as that in an open auction. However, see Das Varma (1999) in which it is shown that with 3 bidders and privately known 'strong/weak' identities, the open ascending bid auction generates a higher expected net surplus.
32:
If bidder values are ex-ante asymmetric, then in a …rst-price sealed-bid auction, there may also be such ex-post bidder regret (due to the resulting asymmetric equilibrium) even though interim and ex-post willingnesses-to-pay are identical.
33: Observe that this notion of ex-post regret is quite di¤erent from the notion of ex-post ine¢ciency.
34: This is a particularly attractive property of the equilibrium. Consider a more realistic model of the open outcry auction where bidders do not quit irrevocably, but can rejoin the bidding even if they have been silent for some time. In such a model, no bidder can be expected to concede the auction so long as her willingness-to-pay with respect to the standing high bidder exceeds the standing high bid. No ex-post regret is then a natural requirement of optimal bidding in such a model. In our model, no ex-post regret is not imposed as part of a bidder's optimization, but rather, turns out to be a property of the equilibrium.
35: It is clear from the discussion following Proposition 3 that relaxing the assumption that no bidder can be strong with respect to more than one of her rivals can lead to some ex-post regret even in the open auction. However see Das Varma (1999) , where this assumption is not made, but losing bidders are shown to stay active up until prices that exceed their average willingness-topay. Therefore, even without this assumption, losing bidders have less ex-post regret in the open ascending-bid auction than in a sealed-bid auction.
36: In the present analysis, default is not a strategy available to the winning bidder. Needless to say, if it were, then a price higher than the winning bidder's use value might induce default (ex-post regret), depending on how the auctioneer deals with such default.
37: For purposes of the proof of Proposition 4, we have used the …rst quitter's drop out price v (1) + e. Varma (1999) shows that this intuition is true even in a model where strong/weak identities are private information to bidders. 39: In numerical computations that employ the Normal distribution, we use a zero reserve price to rule out negative prices.
38: Das

40:
The plots are consistent with the natural intuition that in the limit e = 0, the two auction formats should yield the same expected revenue.
41: Notice that we have not used j as an argument in G(:jp) because of our interest in an equilibrium in strategies that are symmetric within each phase among bidders whose strong rivals are active.
42:
The case i = s w i is analytically identical to case (i), and therefore does not need to be examined separately.
43: Only indirectly for bidders fj; j + 1; ::i ¡ 2g, via the now greater probability that their own strong rivals will exit at a lower price than they otherwise would if i remained active.
